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Introduction
We must not listen to those who advise us ‘being men to think human 
thoughts, and being mortal to think mortal thoughts’ but must put on immor-
tality as much as possible and strain every nerve to live according to that best 
part of us, which, being small in bulk, yet much more in its power and honor 
surpasses all else (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics).
In his essay, “The Implications of Ego Depletion for the Ethics and Politics of Manipula-
tion”, Michael Cholbi argues that moral chara er plays no role in ego-depleted, manipulated 
a ion (2014). He bases  his claim on ego depletion studies in the psychological literature. Using 
an Aristotelian account of virtue and moral chara er, I will give two arguments as to why Chol-
bi’s conclusion is too quick. While conceding the possibility of ego depletion and its potential 
influence in a manipulated environment, I first argue that chara er plays precisely the role that 
Aristotle believed it to play for at least two chara er types. Indeed, ego depletion studies may 
be good indicators of these types of chara er. Second, I argue that Cholbi has made a mistake in 
causal reasoning – because these ego depletion studies have not controlled for the influence of 
all-things-considered judgment in the participant’s deliberation – judgments which are central to 
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Michael Cholbi argues that moral character plays no role in ego-depleted, manipulated 
action (2014). He bases his claim on ego depletion studies in the psychological literature. 
Using an Aristotelian account of virtue and moral character, I will give two arguments as to 
why Cholbi’s conclusion is too quick. While conceding the possibility of ego depletion and 
its potential influence in a manipulated environment, I first argue that character plays pre-
cisely the role that Aristotle believed it to play for at least two character types. Indeed, ego 
depletion studies may be good indicators of these types of character. Second, I argue that 
Cholbi has made a mistake in causal reasoning – because these ego depletion studies have 
not controlled for the influence of all-things-considered judgment in the participant’s delib-
eration – judgments which are central to Aristotle’s understanding of character – Cholbi is 
not justified in concluding that character plays no role in ego-depleted, manipulated action.
Keywords: manipulation, action theory, ego depletion, character, virtue ethics, Aristotle, 
Cholbi.
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Aristotle’s understanding of chara er – Cholbi is not justified 
in concluding that chara er plays no role in ego-depleted, 
manipulated a ion. 
Cholbi on ego depletion 
and manipulation
Ego depletion has received much attention in the philo-
sophical and psychological literature since its introduction in 
the groundbreaking Baumeister et al. paper, “Ego Depletion: 
Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?” (1998). In that study, 
the authors offer the following definition of ego depletion, 
which will be assumed for the rest of this paper: 
[Ego depletion is] a temporary reduction in 
the self’s capacity or willingness to engage 
in volitional action (including controlling the 
environment, controlling the self, making 
choices, and initiating action) caused by 
prior exercise of volition (Baumeister et al., 
1998, p. 1253). 
In other words, they believe that when willing some act 
on behalf of oneself, one uses a limited resource that is capable 
of being depleted, thus making it more difficult to will the 
next a ion (p. 1252). This phenomenon of ego depletion ap-
plies to acts of volition issuing from the self ’s “executive func-
tion,” or acts resulting from “the self a ing autonomously on 
its own behalf ” (p. 1252). Thus, they associate ego depletion 
with conscious, autonomous acts of the will.
Ego depletion has obvious implications, the clearest be-
ing that an agent who exercises her will at moment t
1
 will 
be more ego-depleted at t
1
 than she was at t
2
, and thus will 
find it harder to will a particular a ion at t
2
 than she would 
have if she had not willed an a ion at t
1
. By hypothesis, “find 
it harder” simply means that an ego-depleted agent will have 
less strength or energy to will a particular a ion at t
2
.
Michael Cholbi believes another implication of ego de-
pletion is that those who are “well-positioned to manipulate 
others [may do so] by creating choice environments tempo-
rally ordered so that ego depletion makes individual agents 
more likely to choose in ways the manipulator desires that 
they choose” (2014, p. 203). Let us call this the Ego Depletion 
Manipulation Thesis (EDMT). This thesis says that those who 
are familiar with ego depletion may use that knowledge to 
manipulate others. They can do so by offering other agents 
temporally ordered choices when those agents are ego-de-
pleted and less likely to resist their wayward desires. Cholbi 
makes one further claim – a claim which will be the central 
focus of this paper. He argues that the EDMT implies that 
moral chara er plays no role in ego-depleted, manipulated 
a ion; or at least, less of a role than we previously thought. 
I will explore how this implication works in a moment. 
Cholbi distinguishes between the standard view of ma-
nipulation and a subtler type, which he calls “ambient manip-
ulation.” According to this type, “manipulation occurs when an 
individual operates within a constructed environment designed 
to encourage her to make certain choices, even without those 
doing the encouraging being present” (2014, p. 208). So ambient 
manipulation is a function of one’s environment. It is this type 
of manipulation with which the EDMT is primarily concerned. 
For Cholbi, the key to manipulation and its implications 
for chara er’s (non)-role in ego-depleted deliberation seems 
to be that ego depletion results in a person a ing against her 
otherwise-settled, all-things-considered judgments. For the 
purposes of this essay, I will understand these judgments to 
be what an agent would judge her best course of a ion to be 
if she were placed within a particular context, all relevant rea-
sons for a ing and against a ing having been considered by 
the agent. Let us denote the agent’s all-things-considered judg-
ment as R
a
. It is pivotal to Cholbi’s account that R
a
 is not the 
reason for an ego-depleted agent’s a ion, but rather the judg-
ment she would make upon reflection, outside of the choice 
environment. Cholbi contends an ego-depleted individual is 
less likely to act in her own best interests; ego-depleting events 
make it harder for her executive function to will the next ac-
tion, so it is more likely that she acts against R
a
. This does not 
necessarily mean that she acts without recognizing reasons in 
the moment; instead, if she, being ego-depleted, is manipulat-
ed into doing a ion X based on reason R
1
, the assumption is 
that she would not have done X when not ego-depleted, be-
cause her usual reason, R
a
, for not doing X would have been 
sufficient to keep her from doing X. But given the agent’s ma-
nipulated choice-structure due to ego depletion, R
1
 is all she 
needs to will X instead of R
a
. In other words, if she would nor-
mally act on R
a
 when not ego-depleted, she may not see R
a
 as 
sufficient reason not to do X when she is ego-depleted. In fact, 
she may not recognize R
a
 at all, but instead respond to R
1
 in a 
way that she would normally prefer not to respond. 
On this reading of Cholbi, there are two interconnected 
reasons for the agent’s anomalous a ion. First, she is ego-de-
pleted. Second – and a consequence of the first reason – the 
agent’s choice-structure has been rearranged without her con-
scious assent. Thus, her usual judgments about what count 
as reasons, and e ecially her all-things-considered judgment 
about what the best a ion is, are irrelevant to her when ego-de-
pleted – but not because she thinks them to be irrelevant in the 
moment. Rather, she does not think about them in the way she 
usually does. Thus, her executive function is not responsive to 
R
a
 in the way it normally would be on her behalf. Admittedly, 
the mechanics of Cholbi’s account are still unclear, which is it-
self a criticism. But rather than getting bogged down here, we 
can understand Cholbi to be asserting ego depletion requires 
that an agent, when making an ego-depleted decision, will not 
understand R
a
 to be her usual all-things-considered judgment. 
Indeed, it will not be the agent’s reason for a ion.
Finally, Cholbi says that the goal of ambient manipu-
lation is to “encourage her to make certain choices” (2014, 
p. 208). Notice, however, that putting an ego-depleted agent 
into a manipulated environment wherein she must make a 
choice does not yet explain why she is more likely to choose 
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against R
a
 when making an ego-depleted decision. It would 
seem the ego depletion literature simply implies that she will 
have trouble willing anything at all, rather than only having 
trouble willing her all-things-considered judgments. That is, 
no matter what the choices may be or how they are made, a 
state of ego depletion in the agent only implies that she will be 
reluctant to engage in volitional a ion, period.
At this point in the argument, Cholbi gets help from 
Richard Holton’s (2009) theory of “judgment shifts.” Chol-
bi argues that ego depletion results in a shift of judgment 
which results in the affected individual not being able to rec-
ognize and act on R
a
, but instead to act on desires formed at 
the time of the weakening of the executive function within 
the context of ego depletion. “Ego depletion thus makes a 
difference not to a ing rationally as such but to wheth-
er we do what we most have reason to do” (2014, p. 212). 
So it would seem that Cholbi means to say that the agent 
does not act for reasons, but simply based on desires which 
do not require a forceful act of the will to pursue. Or, if one 
prefers to think of desires as reasons, one can understand 
Cholbi to be saying that these reasons are the only ones the 
agent seriously considers before a ing. 
Still, we may wonder what is  ecial about these de-
sire-reasons that would make her consider them more in an 
ego-depleted state. Cholbi is not exactly clear on this point, as 
he rejects Holton’s understanding of judgment shifts being the 





 as one’s all-things-considered 
judgment.  Instead, Cholbi simply claims that ego depletion 
interferes with the executive function “so as to produce de-
sires that, in turn, bar agents from recognizing and a ing 
upon their all-things-considered judgments” (2014, p. 212). 
For Cholbi, then, the driving force behind judgment shifts 
seems to be a desire contrary to the agent’s all-thing-consid-
ered judgment – in the sense that it interferes with the agent’s 
ability to recognize R
a 
as her all-things-considered judgment. 
The import for manipulation is obvious: the manipulator 
can use ego depletion as a means of pitting a person’s desires 
against that person’s reasons. It is not necessary to manipulate 
a person’s desires or beliefs directly, but rather the context of 
choice. Ego-depleted choices may still be based on reasons, but 
these choices are irrational insofar as they depend on the seem-
ingly irrelevant-with-re ect-to-reasons temporal arrange-





Though the time at which a choice is made should not, ceteris 
paribus, usually matter, things are different when ego-depleted. 
When ego-depleted, an agent will have more difficulty a ing 




 (post ego depletion) than at t
1 
(pre 
ego depletion). Further, it will not do to argue that at t
2
 we can 
simply attribute a new all-things-considered judgment to the 
agent. Because we are assuming ego depletion, we must con-
cede that the ego-depleted agent finds it difficult to exercise 
his executive function, i.e. to act autonomously on his own 
behalf. Holton and Cholbi understand this to mean that the 
agent finds it difficult to act in a way that the agent judges best 
for him, all-things-considered. Thus, if one were to say that the 
agent’s all-things-considered judgment changes when ego-de-
pleted, this claim would amount to saying that the agent does 
exercise his executive faculty in a way that he judges best for 
him, all-things-considered. But in fact, I have claimed that the 
EDMT assumes that he does not. To summarize: to use ego 
depletion for manipulation, the manipulator must alter the 
manipulated agent’s environment so that she undergoes a judg-
ment shift, thereby recognizing and responding to desire-rea-
sons that are normally insufficient to make her act against her 
usual all-things-considered judgment. 
All of this discussion serves as a necessary precursor to 
Cholbi’s central claim, against which I argue for the remain-
der of this essay: he claims that the EDMT implies that the 
emphasis on chara er within the Aristotelian ethical tradi-
tion is misguided – that is, chara er plays far less of a role 
in self-controlled decisions than Aristotle assumed – for ego 
depletion and other situational/temporal factors influence 
an agent in non-rational ways that often result in an agent 
a ing apart from his or her own e ablished chara er. Let 
us call such a ion “out of chara er”. I will discuss the re-
lation between chara er and all-things-considered judg-
ments in the next section.  
I conclude this section with a brief example, to which I 
will make continued reference for the remainder of this pa-
per. Cholbi considers a shopper in a supermarket. Normally, a 
person entering the store who has judged, all things considered 
(R
a
), that chocolate and cigarettes should be avoided will not 
seek those items out, even if that person has desires for those 
objects which are contrary to R
a
. But his executive function will 
find it harder to resist such temptations when they are offered at 
checkout after an hour of ego-depleting choices, i.e. employing 
his executive functions to make informed decisions regarding 
nutritional data, recipe data, pricing data, and the like. In other 
words, because a lengthy period of pra icing self-control and 
good decision-making leads to ego depletion, it is more likely 
that our unfortunate shopper can be manipulated to act against 
his own better judgment when his choices are arranged in such 
a way. By the time he arrives at checkout, he may not be able 
to recognize his all-things-considered judgment about candy/
cigarettes. Instead, he may act for new desire-reasons: “I’m re-
ally hungry and tired – I need some sugar and some smokes to 
revive my energy.” In the moment of temptation, it is easier for 
the executive function to act according to these reasons, rath-
er than R
a
. Notice, too, that this new judgment is not a new 
all-things-considered judgment, as Holton would claim. Rath-
er, on Cholbi’s account, if asked in a non-ego-depleted state, 
the shopper would not agree that these desire-reasons justify 
buying sugar and smokes. Rather, this new judgment derives 




Cholbi’s view seems plausible. My dispute is not with 
his analysis of the possibility of the temporal influence of ego 
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depletion within a manipulated choice environment, but 
with the theoretical conclusions he draws about the limits of 
chara er in relation to ego depletion, and e ecially with his 
much-too-brief discussion of the role chara er plays in deci-
sion-making within the Aristotelian tradition. Cholbi mere-
ly mentions one type of chara er, the temperate (virtuous), 
deeming it “rare and ephemeral” (2014, p. 214). Aristotle, 
however, describes six moral states of chara er, at least three 
of which are relevant to the topic of manipulation. Discussing 
Aristotle’s view of the six moral states of chara er will take 
us too far afield. For the purposes of this essay, it will only be 
necessary to discuss the temperate (virtuous), the continent, 
and the incontinent of chara er.
Turning to Aristotle’s theory, the basic heuristic of char-
a er-types from Book III.10-12 and Book VII of his Nicoma-
chean Ethics is as follows:
•  Virtuous: Subject to rational principle; have moderate/
good appetites
•  Continent: Subject to rational principle; have exces-
sive/bad appetites
•  Incontinent: Knowledge of, but not subject to, the ra-
tional principle; excessive/bad appetites
When Aristotle talks of the “rational principle,” he 
means something like the rational part of the soul which 
rightly moves someone towards the best objects (Book I.13). 
In relation to pra ical reason, the rational principle requires 
the rational person, insofar as she acts rationally, to discern 
the universal and minor premises of a pra ical syllogism, and 
thus act in a manner that ‘fits’ the rational principle. The part 
of the soul comprised of appetites, on the other hand, may 
submit or rebel against the rational principle, depending on 
the soul’s e ablished dispositions or habituation (Book I.13). 
This interpretation of chara er in Aristotle is perhaps 
overly simplified and not without opposition, but given the 
bounds of this essay, this interpretation suffice to give one 
possible Aristotelian response to Cholbi. Notice, first, that 
Aristotle’s virtuous person is subject to the rational principle 
and has desires for what is good. In Aristotle’s prose, the tem-
perate (virtuous) person desires “the things he ought, as he 
ought, and when he ought; and this is what the rational prin-
ciple directs” (Book III.12). So we might say that the temper-
ate’s all-things-considered judgment accords with the tem-
perate’s desires. Perhaps it would be a misstep to substitute 
“all-things-considered judgment” for “rational principle,” but 
it seems like a plausible gloss on Aristotle’s language. Because 
the rational principle serves to order a person’s reasons for 
a ing, and because the rational principle also serves to move 
a person towards what is good, it does not seem like a stretch 
to say that Aristotle’s “rational principle” serves the same role 
as Cholbi’s “all-things-considered judgments.” Indeed, we 
might simply want to say that for Aristotle the rational prin-
ciple of an agent dictates that agent’s all-things-considered 
judgments. Let us assume this is so. With this understanding 
of chara er in hand, I will now move to analyze the relation-
ship between chara er and ego-depleted a ion. 
The virtuous person’s all-things-considered judgments 
accord with his desires. By definition, a virtuous person does 
not desire a ions contrary to his all-things-considered judg-
ments. Thus, the EDMT may be true, but simply not apply 
to the virtuous person. A virtuous person, no matter how 
ego-depleted, simply will not desire to buy cigarettes or can-
dy after an hour of shopping because such desires would be 
contrary to his e ablished all-things-considered judgment,2 
whether or not he recognizes his all-things-considered judg-
ment as such when ego-depleted. For Aristotle, if such a con-
trary desire arose, the agent would, by definition, simply be 
intemperate if that desire was not in correct relation and pro-
portion to the agent’s usual rational principle. 
Cholbi seems aware of this objection; therefore, rather 
than debating the possibility of the virtuous person’s ability 
to be manipulated, he argues that such a person is rare and 
ephemeral. But this is an empirical claim about the frequen-
cy of a certain chara er-type, not a claim about whether or 
not chara er plays a role in ego-depleted choices. In fact, we 
have seen that on an Aristotelian scheme, in order for some-
one to be considered virtuous, chara er must play a role. In 
response to the charge of rarity, I argue that rarity is hardly 
a problem for Aristotle. Aristotle’s argument does not rely 
upon how common virtue really is; indeed, his overall rhet-
oric seems to imply that the virtuous person is rare, and per-
haps only theoretical. In any case, more empirical evidence on 
both sides would be required to decide. Because some people 
in the ego depletion experiments did not act intemperately 
when manipulated and ego-depleted, it is possible that their 
a ions were a direct result of their temperate chara er.3 
For the moment, let us pass over the rather complicated 
case of the continent chara er and move on to the inconti-
nent. This person has the appropriate all-things-considered 
judgment, but does not abide by it due to conflicting desires 
– the incontinent of chara er acts against his all-things-con-
sidered judgment. That is, the incontinent has the same ratio-
nal principle as the virtuous, but this principle conflicts with 
his current appetites. Thus, the incontinent of chara er may 
be subject to manipulation in accordance with the EDMT. 
But Cholbi’s claim that the EDMT implies that chara er 
plays no role does not follow. It is easy to see why. While an 
agent is ego-depleted and experiencing a strong desire for cig-
2 Of course, this point assumes, for the sake of argument, that smoking and eating candy are actions contrary to the rational principle 
of the virtuous.
3 Cholbi also references situationist experiments, which some interpret as conclusive evidence that “human behavior is more heavily 
influenced by external or situational factors than by durable psychological traits or features” (2014, p. 213). Again, this may be true. But 
it is worth mentioning that in at least some of the experiments, although many acted against their all-things-considered judgments, a 
small percentage did not. Might those few have been temperate?
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arettes or candy which conflicts with his usual all-things-con-
sidered judgments, it is likely that he will indulge. In fact, due 
to judgment shifts caused by the manipulated environment, 
he may not even consider not buying candy. But in this case, 
it accords with his chara er, since he is the type of person who 
acts against his all-things-considered judgment when faced 
with inordinate desires. Contrary to Cholbi’s argument, then, 
the incontinent’s chara er does indeed play a pivotal role in 
the a ions he takes. In fact, given the ego depletion studies, 
it may simply be that a larger percentage of the population is 
incontinent than Cholbi would have thought.
We might conclude from this initial analysis of the 
virtuous and incontinent chara er types that ego deple-
tion studies serve as a good test for chara erizing a person. 
That is, we can simply turn Cholbi’s claim on its head: the 
ego depletion studies show what types of desires a person 
has when ego-depleted, because the person in an ego-de-
pleted environment acts according to these desire-rea-
sons. If the person’s a ions accord with the person’s usual 
all-things-considered judgment, he may very well be vir-
tuous (assuming, as I did above, that all-things-considered 
judgments are dictated by a rational principle which directs 
a person to act as they ‘ought’). If he does not act according 
to his usual all-things-considered judgment, he would seem 
to be incontinent (but I will need to qualify this statement 
after considering the continent of chara er). 
Cholbi might object that I have not made a case for the 
role of chara er in ego-depleted a ion as much as I have 
shown that certain a ions may be deemed virtuous or incon-
tinent. In other words, Cholbi might still argue that charac-
ter plays no role in an ego-depleted environment precisely 
because moral chara er requires a certain type of response 
to one’s all-things-considered judgment; but by hypothe-
sis, those who are ego-depleted have an executive function 
that is not properly responsive to their all-things-considered 
judgments. Indeed, they may not be in a state to judge at all. 
Thus, whether or not their a ions when ego-depleted hap-
pen to correspond to what would be their all-things-consid-
ered judgment when not ego-depleted, ego-depleted a ion 
cannot be a function of their chara er. Chara er requires 
judgment; if no judgment is made, chara er is not involved. 
Rather, it is only a function of their desires and non-rational 
environmental factors. The import of this objection is that 
ego-depleted decisions cannot be determined by the agent’s 
chara er while in an ego-depleted state because these deci-
sions do not take into account the all-things-considered judg-
ments which would normally issue from the agent’s chara er. 
Indeed, whatever the ego-depleted a ion, it may properly be 
called “out of chara er” for the agent.
To this objection, an Aristotelian can reply that wheth-
er or not the agents in the study were conscious of their 
all-things-considered judgments in the moment, what really 
matters for chara er is whether their a ions accorded with 
the rational principle. If their a ions did not accord with the 
rational principle, they are incontinent. If their a ions did 
accord, they are temperate. In either case, because an agent’s 
appetites play a role in the agent’s chara er, the ego deple-
tion studies can still help us decide the nature of an agent’s 
chara er by showing us how the ego-depleted agent acts. For 
Aristotle e ecially, such a ion reveals chara er.
But what about the case of the continent? Recall that, 
for Aristotle, the continent person is one who is able to sub-
mit to the rational principle in the presence of contradictory 
desires. So then, a continent person does not act contrary to 
her rational principle and all-things-considered judgment, 
even though her desires may be opposed to those judgments. 
But assuming the continent person can only act based on de-
sire-reasons when in an ego-depleted state, i.e. assuming the 
EDMT, we seem to be faced with the conclusion that those of 
continent chara er will act according to desires which may 
be contrary to their all-things-considered judgment. That is, 
the continent may perform a ions “out of chara er,” thus up-
holding Cholbi’s claim that the EDMT implies that chara er 
plays no role in ego-depleted environments. 
At a first pass, the Aristotelian might be tempted to ar-
gue that by definition the continent person, no matter how 
ego-depleted, simply will not buy cigarettes or candy, even 
though she experiences contrary desires (assuming that buying 
such things contradicts her all-things-considered judgments). 
Instead, she will act according to the rational principle and her 
all-things-considered judgment. But for what reason would 
she act in this way, given that she is at this moment ego-de-
pleted and, as stipulated by the EDMT, does not recognize her 
all-things-considered judgment? If it is because she does not 
have wayward desires, then she, by definition, is not continent, 
but virtuous; if it is because she recognizes her all-things-con-
sidered judgment, then she does not fall under the purview of 
the EDMT. The only way out for the Aristotelian would seem 
to be to claim that the continent acts for some other reason, 
which by happy coincidence accords with her rational principle 
(which she does not recognize when ego-depleted) but which 
does not accord with her ego-depleted desires. But it is hard to 
see what such a reason could be, if not a strong desire-reason 
or all-things-considered judgment. If it is a fleeting thought or 
random neurological event, the Aristotelian would not want to 
attribute this to the agent’s chara er. Thus, if we understand 
ego-depletion as stipulated by the EDMT, explaining the role 
of the continent agent’s chara er in an ego-depleted environ-
ment is difficult for the Aristotelian.
A better way out for the Aristotelian is to deny the 
understanding of ego depletion assumed by the EDMT, 
i.e. to deny the controversial claim I made in the beginning 
that ego depletion requires an agent to be unaware of her 
all-things-considered-judgment. Indeed, my second argu-
ment against Cholbi is that to grant this controversial claim 
is to grant more than the data suggests. Cholbi has made a 
mistake in causal reasoning. Those who conducted the study 
did not ask the participants whether they had in mind their 
usual all-things-considered-judgement when deliberating. 
Indeed, as I mentioned at the very beginning, ego depletion 
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as understood by Baumeister et al. does not require that an 
agent fail to recognize his all-things-considered judgment 
as such when deliberating. Rather, it only requires that he 
find the next act of will more difficult than the last, where 
the evidence used to make this claim was that more people 
seemed to act against their all-things-considered judgment 
when ego-depleted than those who were not ego-depleted. 
But because some people did act in accordance with their 
all-things-considered judgment, it may very well be that those 
people who exercised self-control did so because they recog-
nized their all-things-considered judgments as reasons. That 
is, some people may have a ed as they did because they were 
continent or virtuous. 
So in order to understand the EDMT and its impli-
cations in the way that Cholbi has, we would need a study 
that controls for all-things-considered judgments and their 
role in ego-depleted deliberation. Because the original study 
does not control for these judgments, my Cholbi-inspired in-
ference that chara er plays no role for the continent agent 
in a manipulated, ego-depleted environment is unsupported 
by the study. In order for my Cholbian inference to be valid, 
the new study I am suggesting would have to overcome sev-
eral problems: not only would the researchers need to know 
the agents’ all-things-considered judgments, they would also 
need to e ablish that desires contrary to these judgments 
were driving the decisions of these agents while ego-deplet-
ed; moreover, they would need to know that the agents made 
no reference to their all-things-considered judgments when 
deliberating. Finally, they would need to contrast the agents 
in the manipulated, ego-depleted environment with agents 
in a non-ego-depleted environment (where the agents in the 
non-ego-depleted environment have most likely not under-
gone judgment shifts). Assuming such a study is even possible, 
the EDMT and Cholbi’s inference would be confirmed if the 
continent and incontinent choose similarly in the ego-deplet-
ed environment, in contrast to how continent agents choose 
in the non-ego-depleted environment.
Conclusion
The central argument of this paper is that Cholbi’s infer-
ence from the EDMT is invalid. First, I argued that if we as-
sume the EDMT is correct, it is only relevant for those who are 
continent of chara er. To put it another way, if the EDMT is 
correct, it can help us identify the virtuous. Because the EDMT 
assumes that desires play the decisive role in ego-depleted de-
liberation, and because the virtuous and incontinent act in ac-
cordance with their desires, we can assume they will do so in 
the ego-depleted environment. Those who act in accordance 
with their all-things-considered judgments in the ego-depleted 
environments are virtuous. Those who do not may be inconti-
nent, in which case their chara er plays precisely the role we 
would expect. Or, they may be continent. But it is only in the 
case of the continent that we may infer that chara er does not 
play a role in the ego-depleted, manipulated environment. This 
is due to the fact that the continent appear to be a ing incon-
tinently and, thus, out of chara er. 
But second, I argued that such a conclusion is purely 
hypothetical; it cannot be confirmed by the original ego de-
pletion study. To think that it does is to make a mistake in 
causal reasoning. Instead, we need a study that controls for 
all-things-considered judgments in manipulated, ego-deplet-
ed and non-ego-depleted environments. If those studies show 
that those who act according to their all-things-considered 
judgments in ego-depleted environments do so because they 
recognize those judgments as their best reasons for a ion, 
and if those people have already been identified as virtuous 
or continent of chara er, this fact will confirm not only that 
Cholbi’s inference is invalid, but also that the EDMT is false.  
The upshot of this second argument is that Aristotle, 
theorizing about the role of chara er in decision-making and 
a ion, may still provide us with a way to make sense of the 
empirical data, i.e. why people act the way they do. Indeed, 
my argument implies that Aristotle’s conceptions of char-
a er may be used to falsify an empirical hypothesis, i.e. the 
EDMT. In fact, it points the way to a new study that con-
trols for all-things-considered judgments and their role in 
manipulated, ego-depleted and non-ego-depleted environ-
ments. However, it is entirely possible that a new study will 
confirm the EDMT, thus making continence of chara er 
irrelevant to a person’s decision-making when in a manipu-
lated environment in an ego-depleted state. Whether or not 
Aristotle is correct in his division of chara er types is worth 
knowing precisely because it tells us whether or not devel-
oping our own chara er matters for how we make decisions 
when ego-depleted – a state which is common, and for which 
we typically think chara er matters (“When the going gets 
tough, the tough get going!”). But if the EDMT is confirmed 
by the second study that this paper calls for, then a ing ‘con-
tinently’ when ego-depleted is a pipe dream.
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